In the course of publishing reportages and investigations about the resistance movement against the Russian occupation in Kherson, as well as from available open sources, we developed a case study of resistance as observed in a specific region, which we are presenting in four parts.

In the first part of this material, we explore the role of the FSB and GRU in planning the so-called «special military operation», focusing on the Kremlin’s strategic planning, covert agent operations, attempts to undermine Ukraine’s legal state institutions, the escalation of internal tensions within the country, and Ukraine’s response to the unfolding crisis.

Introduction and Part 1

The Russian occupation of the city of Kherson, Ukraine, in 2022 serves as an example of the colonialist ethnic cleansing carried out by Russian authorities. Although no major battles took place in Kherson, approximately 70% of the city's population left during the eight months of Russian occupation. These people did not flee due to constant bombardment but rather as a direct result of the actions of the Russian administration. This process requires deeper examination, as the fate of those who lost their homes and livelihoods has unjustly faded into the background amid various peace negotiations. Likewise, the fate of those who joined the resistance — as well as the very nature of the Ukrainian tradition of resistance and resilience — deserves special attention.

This report originated from the documentary film project «The Invisible Front of Kherson», which explored the Ukrainian resistance movement against Russian occupation in Kherson, southern Ukraine, in 2022. As part of the film's background research, 25 interviews were conducted, revealing a far more complex reality than initially expected. This led to the compilation of the present report, which combines qualitative analysis of the interviews with additional context from publicly available sources.

While much has already been written about the occupation of Kherson as a distinct case, insufficient attention has been paid to the evolving nature of Russian occupation and Ukrainian resistance across different phases. This dynamic extends beyond simplistic propaganda narratives and allows for comparisons between the Ukrainian resistance movement and, for example, European resistance movements against Nazi Germany during World War II. Such analysis also provides another perspective for forecasting possible future scenarios in Russia’s neighbouring regions.

Academically, this report draws from the tradition of analysing resistance movements, counterinsurgency, and stabilization operations.

Since Ukrainian legislation adopted in 2021 assigned the task of organizing the resistance movement in the event of a potential Russian occupation to the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine (SSO) (President of Ukraine, 2021), this report primarily focuses on analysing the experience of the SSO.

Our objective was to test the following hypotheses:

1. Countering NATO expansion was neither the only nor the primary reason why the Russian Federation launched a full-scale aggression against Ukraine.
2. The rapid occupation of Kherson in 2022 demonstrates that corruption became a realized security risk.
3. The main characteristic of Russia’s occupation methods is Russification policies and ethnic cleansing, implemented not only through military force but also through various state influence mechanisms.
4. Kherson saw both a spontaneous resistance movement and organized operations by Ukrainian special services occurring simultaneously.
5. Kherson’s nonviolent resistance was primarily rooted in grassroots spontaneous movements and played a crucial symbolic role in sustaining the resistance.

THE ROAD TO CRISIS

In April 2021, the Russian Federation (RF) amassed a force of up to 120,000 troops near Ukraine’s borders, while firefights between Russian and Ukrainian forces also intensified. Fears of a renewed major war were already circulating at that time. (Bielieskov, 2021) Yet, nothing happened immediately. It is possible that at this stage, Russia was merely testing the reactions of Ukraine and the West, with the planning of a concrete invasion operation beginning only in June 2021.

On the Ukrainian side, one key indicator for understanding Russian intentions was the activity of a GRU-backed reconnaissance group apprehended in Donetsk Oblast in the spring of 2021. The evidence seized from them revealed highly specific military intelligence gathering. What made it particularly telling was the deployment of such a highly professional «reconnaissance-diversion group» deep behind Ukrainian lines — something that would not have made sense unless the intelligence gathered was expected to have immediate operational value. As a result, there were people within Ukraine’s special services who were convinced that the Russian Federation was preparing for a larger war. («Yuri», 2024)

What then was Putin’s political objective toward Ukraine in 2021? There is no single, clear answer, as the Kremlin was issuing documents with varying focus at the time. On one hand, for example, the updated edition of the «National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation», approved on July 2, 2021, stated that «unfriendly states are attempting to sever Russia’s ties with its partners», and that the placement of NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders constitutes a military threat. (Security Council of the Russian Federation, 2021, p.11.) From this perspective, one could indeed argue that the root cause of the war in Ukraine was NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe. However, Ukraine was not mentioned even once in the «National Security Strategy».

On the other hand, Russia also has a historical tradition of Russian nationalism, which has been used to justify both colonial and imperial policies. Here, we are not speaking of fringe ideologues or propagandists, but of senior state officials with direct influence over Russian policy. For example, as early as 1992, the concept of «Russians compatriots abroad» was introduced into policy by Sergey Karaganov, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. This concept turned ethnic Russians living abroad into both subjects and instruments of state policy. The so-called “Karaganov Doctrine” called for controlling the policies of Russia’s neighboring states under the pretext of protecting the rights of these «compatriots». (MacKinnon, M. 2014) Notably, the doctrine did not exclude the use of nuclear weapons. This ideology was formalized into official policy through a 1999 law on the Russian Federation’s state policy toward compatriots living abroad. (Russian Federation, 1999) Even in 2024, during a public appearance in Russia, Karaganov stated: «We are a people chosen by God to defend the freedom of all nations and peoples. To do that, we must rethink the use of nuclear weapons. We must employ intimidation (ustrasheniye) as part of nuclear deterrence (sderzhivanie)». (Clemens, W. 2023)

Thus, since at least 1999, there has existed a doctrine in the Russian Federation that potentially limited the sovereignty of countries within Russia’s sphere of influence to make independent domestic policy decisions — and threatened them with military intervention if they did not comply.

Closely aligned with this line of thinking are also the ideological statements of Vladislav Surkov, who served as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and, from 2013 to 2020, as a presidential aide overseeing policy in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine. He is credited with reviving the Tsarist-era colonial conquest term «Novorossiya» in 2014. In a 2020 interview, Surkov claimed that «the Ukrainian state does not exist. «Coercion in fraternal relations has historically been the only effective method toward Ukraine. I don’t think any other method will be invented», he added. (Surkov, V. 2020) A year later, Surkov published an article stating: «For Russia, constant expansion is not just one idea among many—it is the existential reality of our historical existence». (Surkov, V. 2021)

This ideological lineage also includes President Vladimir Putin’s programmatic article, «On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians», published on June 12, 2021, in which he described at least part of Ukrainian territory as «primordial Russian land». (Putin, 2021) Putin reiterated similar views later, including in his 2024 interview with Tucker Carlson (Carlson, 2024), suggesting that NATO expansion is not the Kremlin’s only rationale for launching war. In fact, Putin has long drawn on historical constructs from the Russian Empire. For instance, on April 17, 2014, in a public appearance, he referred to «Novorossiya», a region that during the imperial era included today's eastern and southern Ukraine. In the same speech, Putin made a revisionist statement: «Only God knows why Russia gave that region to Ukraine in 1922». In the mid-18th century, «Novorossiya» included the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, Nikolaev, and Odessa regions, as well as Crimea. (Basora and Fischer, 2014)

Thus, within the Russian public discourse, we find a narrative articulated by high-ranking officials that rationalizes potential military intervention by the Russian Federation beyond its borders. This includes the idea of «Russian exceptionalism» — a narrative that claims the right to limit the sovereignty of other states.

Consequently, as the escalation unfolded in 2021–2022, we observe a series of decisions by the Russian leadership driven by the aspirations of imperial Russian nationalism — not by any tangible «NATO threat». Jack Watling has likewise pointed out that the Russian Federation pursued multiple objectives simultaneously, among them ambitions rooted in imperial ideology. (Watling and Reynolds, 2022)

The FSB’s Leading Role in Planning the «Special Military Operation»

While the Russian Federation (RF) used regular military forces in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, all operations of that period were heavily characterized by the strong involvement of Russian intelligence services. This meant that these operations were initiated under the leadership of intelligence agencies, followed by the deployment of military resources. Two institutions played a key role in the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Donbas:

• The Federal Security Service (FSB): Responsible for orchestrating regime change at the political level, as well as controlling the political direction and representatives of the newly formed «people’s republics».
• The Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU): Tasked with implementing military operations, creating, supplying, and commanding local proxy forces, and conducting intelligence operations.

The annexation of Crimea was considered a successful precedent in the Kremlin, which led to the adoption of a similar model in later RF operations in Ukraine. As a result, the FSB became the central institution for planning subsequent events. Its operational model was directly influenced by Vladimir Putin’s previous experience within this organization. Within the FSB, responsibility for Ukraine-related operations was assigned to Service Five, led by Colonel General Sergei Beseda. This service was further divided into two departments:

• The Department of International Relations, which focused on political influence operations.
• The Department of Operational Information (OIO), led by Lieutenant General Georgy Grishayev.

The Department of Operational Information formed a dedicated «Ukraine unit» known as the 9th Directorate, responsible for directing agents and coordinating operations. Traditionally, the FSB primarily targeted the political elite of former Soviet states. However, the 9th Directorate expanded its activities to include the establishment of occupation administrations (Watling & Reynolds, 2022). Over the years, the number of FSB officers assigned to Ukraine-related operations grew from 20 to 200, reflecting the Kremlin’s increasing focus on destabilizing Ukraine and consolidating control (Watling, Danylyuk & Reynolds, 2023, p.5).

Each occupied region was assigned a Temporary Operational Group (AOG) under the 9th Directorate, responsible for coordinating the occupation regime and counterintelligence activities. AOGs were typically headed by an officer from Service Five, temporarily reinforced with personnel from other security branches, covering military counterintelligence and FSB infrastructure protection. In Kherson, this role was fulfilled by the 8th AOG.

In addition to the AOGs, supporting units included:

• Rosgvardia (National Guard), responsible for maintaining public order and security perimeters.
• FSB special operations units, including SMERSH, Vympel, and other elite squads conducting raids.
• Chechen Rosgvardia units, tasked with eliminating high-value targets.

This operational model had been in use and continuously refined since the Second Chechen War. One of its most active components was likely Spetsnaz Tavria, based in Crimea. Additionally, special operational groups were deployed from Russia with specific mandates, such as enforcing a «ruble zone» and orchestrating pseudo-referendums to formally annex occupied regions into Russia.

The relationship between the Russian military and the FSB was evident in how each AOG assigned a military commandant to oversee security within their respective occupied areas. These commandants had control over specific military units, which were used to seize critical buildings — typically police stations or fire stations — where facilities for detention, interrogation and torture were then established (Watling, Danylyuk & Reynolds, 2023, p.13).

By 2022, as it became clear that the RF’s initial war plan had failed, it also became apparent that the FSB required more personnel to manage the occupation. Consequently, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing Russian citizens, including conscripted soldiers, to serve under contract in the FSB, mirroring the contractual system in the Russian armed forces (Official Publication of Legal Acts, 2022). In practice, this meant that conscripts were used in border guard duties, allowing trained professionals to be reassigned to manning checkpoints and filtration camps.

The GRU’s Role

The GRU’s role in managing the occupation was smaller than that of the FSB, as their specificity primarily required weakening the defensive capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces and the area under Ukrainian control.

One of the GRU’s most crucial functions is targeting enemy positions for indirect fire, such as artillery, rockets, and close air support (CAS). The GRU operates its own intelligence network (observation network) for this purpose. According to Watling, disrupting this network is one of the key security challenges for NATO’s rear areas (Watling, Danylyuk & Reynolds, 2023, p.13).

Additionally, the GRU is responsible for sabotage and subversion deep inside Ukrainian territory. These operations primarily rely on locally recruited individuals, many of whom lack professional training.

Shaping the Battlefield: The Kremlin’s Strategic Planning

In 2020, significant personnel changes took place within the Russian Presidential Administration. The previous coordinator for Ukrainian affairs, Vladislav Surkov, was replaced by Dmitry Kozak (Kremlin, 2020). Kozak, who served in a GRU Spetsnaz unit before his political career, shared a St. Petersburg background with Putin. Kozak’s role involved organizing operations against Ukraine, with the Cross-Border Cooperation Committee effectively serving as a coordination hub for diplomatic, military, and intelligence efforts across various government agencies (Warsaw Institute, 2020).

Russian military doctrine at the time emphasized the importance of indirect methods and avoiding direct armed conflict whenever possible (Minic, 2024). Observing events leading up to the war, it is possible that the Kremlin deliberately kept the final decision on invasion open, aiming instead to achieve its political objectives through other means. Similarly, during the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Donbas operations, there was possibly no clear end state — Russia adapted its approach based on emerging opportunities (Kofman et al., 2017). The period from autumn 2021 to the start of the war can therefore be viewed as a real-world illustration of General Valery Gerasimov’s famous 2013 article, which posited that in the phases leading up to war, non-military means would be used at a 4:1 ratio to military force (Gerasimov, 2013).

Strategic-Level Agent Operations

A defining characteristic of FSB intelligence work has been the recruitment of high-level individuals, who were then tasked with building their own networks. Often, lower-level operatives were unaware they were ultimately working for Russian intelligence. Recruitment was frequently based on corruption, with ideological loyalty playing a lesser role. This method is effective for quickly expanding networks, but less reliable than recruiting agents for ideological reasons. The heavy reliance on a small number of elite agents, who control their own sub-networks, also introduces vulnerabilities—eliminating these key figures significantly degrades intelligence capabilities (Watling, Danylyuk & Reynolds, 2023, p.33).

An example of potential Russian infiltration came in January 2022, when British intelligence revealed that Russia intended to install the pro-Kremlin politician and media mogul Yevhen Murayev as the head of a puppet Ukrainian government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2022). A Rating Group survey conducted in December 2021 found that 6.5% of Ukrainian voters supported Murayev, primarily those skeptical of the EU, NATO, and Kyiv’s leadership (Shandra, 2022). Overall, Russian planning assumed that even if only around 8% of the local population collaborated, voluntarily or under coercion, this would be sufficient to effectively implement a counterintelligence regime. (Watling, Danylyuk, and Reynolds, 2023).

Other prominent Ukrainian figures targeted included former Deputy Head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Vladimir Syvkovych and former Prime Minister under Yanukovych, Mykola Azarov, who had fled to Russia in 2014 (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2022).

Undermining Ukraine’s legal state institutions 

One striking case was the recruitment of SBU Major General Oleg Kulinich, reportedly handled by Vladimir Syvkovich. Kulinich infiltrated Zelensky’s presidential campaign team and later became head of the SBU Crimea Department, where he blocked intelligence on Russian invasion plans from reaching Kyiv. When the war began, he obstructed communications regarding Russian advances in Kherson. In April 2021, Kulinich even organized a large-scale counterterrorism exercise in Kherson to identify Ukraine’s defense vulnerabilities. Kulinich was arrested by the SBU only on July 16, 2022 (Stezhensky, 2025).

These are just a few known examples of FSB agents operating in Ukraine. Many more have been identified, and it is likely that Russian intelligence continues to maintain active networks within the country. 

Escalating Internal Tensions in Ukraine

In 2021, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) noticed Russian-led public opinion surveys aiming to identify topics that would most strongly provoke public anger in Ukrainian society. Russia intended to amplify these issues to trigger anti-government unrest.

During the autumn of 2021, Ukrainian intelligence services also observed coordinated Russian efforts to artificially increase energy prices in Ukraine (Varadhan, 2022; Golubkova, Steitz, and Twidale, 2021). Considering Ukraine’s 60% dependence on Russian gas and oil, this was not particularly challenging. Simultaneously, the SBU identified attempts by Russian-linked NGOs and small businesses to organize protests against the rising cost of living, blaming government incompetence as the underlying cause (Watling and Reynolds, 2022).

The tactic of exploiting energy problems to undermine trust in the government had been repeatedly tested in Ukraine and also used against Western Europe. The Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes between 2005–2010 serve as one example of how Russian gas was weaponized to influence Ukraine’s internal politics. Only after installing a politically favourable partner was an agreement eventually reached.

Yet Russia did not merely rely on spontaneous unrest resulting from increased energy costs. In January 2022, the SBU arrested Yuriy Goluban, a former Ukrainian police colonel and officer in the Alfa special forces unit, previously suspected of collaborating with separatists. Goluban was accused of organizing paid protests in Kyiv and three other regional centres, including participants displaying far-right symbols. The protesters were instructed to criticize the government’s inability to confront the Russian threat. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, approximately 3,500 protesters were offered 800 hryvnias (around $28) each, while about 1,500 were promised 1,200 hryvnias (around $42) to provoke violent clashes with police. This operation was scheduled to commence on January 31, 2022, in Kyiv, designed specifically to support a narrative alleging that far-right elements were executing a coup. This scenario was intended to provide a pretext for Russian invasion and simultaneously weaken potential Ukrainian resistance movements (Zoria, 2022).

Besides FSB also SVR has conducted operations, like building financial mechanisms for fake grassroots protests, ballooning the size of demonstrations relating to energy tariffs, tax reforms and other legitimate concerns. (Watling & Reynolds, 2022, p.9.)

In February 2022, the Ukrainian security services were receiving over 500 hoax bomb calls per month, with around half originating from Russian territory and the remainder from inside Ukraine. There was a recognition that at some point some of those threats will be real. (Watling & Reynolds, 2022, p11.)

The Final Phase of Planning and Negotiations Before Combat

In December 2021, war games were conducted in Moscow, in which Russia’s Airborne Forces (VDV) and the Rosgvardia (National Guard) primarily focused on supporting an FSB-coordinated coup through existing agent networks. The overall plan resembled the earlier Crimea scenario, where a visible military presence (show of force) was deemed sufficient to discourage resistance. However, this time, a more forceful stabilization phase was anticipated, prominently led by intelligence services and Rosgvardia under FSB control. These war games aimed specifically at integrating the existing network of FSB influence agents in Ukraine into the Russian military command structure, ensuring coordinated action. Additionally, these exercises included identifying Ukrainians who might initiate resistance, intending to eliminate them pre-emptively. Notably, Ukraine’s vehicle insurance database — obtained through a large-scale cyberattack — was used for this purpose (Watling and Reynolds, 2022, p.12.).

Besides the «ordinary plan» for military movement across the territory, the special military operation plan expected three primary lines of operation after reaching Kyiv:

1. The first objective was capturing key figures within Ukraine’s government and parliament with assistance from local agents and Russian special operations forces (SSO). Public show trials of these individuals were likely planned.
2. The second objective involved immediately neutralizing potential resistance. The FSB, aided by Kadyrov’s Chechen forces, would hunt down resistance leaders and participants from the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Brutal reprisals resembling events in Grozny after its capture by Russian forces in 2000 were expected.
3. The third line of operation focused on controlling the civilian population. Rosgvardia would isolate city blocks and settlements from each other, handling each enclosed area separately. Demonstrations did not necessarily have to be suppressed immediately through force; instead, organizers would be identified and subsequently dealt with by Kadyrov’s forces (Watling and Reynolds, 2022).

Further details regarding subsequent occupation stabilization tasks will be discussed in Chapter III – Occupation and resistance in Herson

Ukraine’s Reactions

On July 29, 2021, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed into law the «Foundations of National Resistance» and a second law that increased the size of Ukraine’s armed forces. (President of Ukraine, 2021) Although the explanatory notes of these laws did not explicitly mention an elevated threat level, they nonetheless created a legislative foundation for Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces and Territorial Defense Forces to begin preparing specifically for resistance activities — both in areas under Ukrainian control and in temporarily occupied territories.

When examining the actions of the Ukrainian leadership in the subsequent period, special attention must be given to their relationship with Western partners.

In August 2021, the controversial withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Afghanistan took place — a move that was widely interpreted across the globe as a signal that the United States was shifting toward isolationism and was unprepared for escalating engagements.

For Ukraine, this event came at a particularly inopportune time, as it was clear that both President Zelensky and broader Ukrainian society were factoring in the risk of war. This context helps explain why the media gave such wide coverage to President Zelensky’s meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden on September 1–2, 2021. During the meeting, Zelensky sought a clearer commitment from the U.S. regarding NATO membership, but Biden refused. The U.S. position was to avoid giving any concrete promises. Biden’s goal was to merely signal opposition to potential Russian aggression without provoking Moscow on the issue of NATO. (Lu, 2021)

As a result, the only tangible outcome of the meeting was an announcement of $60 million in military aid to Ukraine — a modest sum in the context of future wartime expenses, though it did include Javelin anti-tank missiles. (Collinson, 2021) For comparison, Russia’s military budget at the time was $65 billion, and only a year later, in 2022, did U.S. aid to Ukraine rise to $67 billion. (Masters and Merrow, 2024) Meanwhile, Russian military spending also continued to grow. This means that, as of September 2021, the aid provided to Ukraine amounted to less than 1% of Russia’s comparable budget or Ukraine’s wartime needs. As we now know, this level of support was insufficient as a deterrent.

These two episodes — the signing of the resistance law and the increase in armed forces, as well as Ukraine's efforts to obtain security guarantees from the U.S.— demonstrate that the Ukrainian administration was aware of the threat of war and acted in the interest of deterrence. At the same time, it is likely that while many Western leaders were applying diplomatic pressure on Putin in the autumn of 2021 and into January–February 2022, pressure was also being placed on the Zelensky administration not to provoke Russia while Western diplomacy was still underway.

Ukraine’s budget for 2022, adopted on December 2, 2021, with a 3.5% deficit, allocated $4.6 billion to the Ministry of Defence. (Ukrainian Military Pages, 2021) Since this amount was over 14 times smaller than Russia’s defense budget, it is plausible to speculate that Ukraine’s political leadership placed considerable hope in Western deterrence efforts, as the raw numbers suggested that Ukraine stood little chance of successfully defending itself alone.

At the same time, some military preparations were underway in Ukraine, albeit out of public view. In a November 2021 interview, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR), Kyrylo Budanov, stated that the Russian Federation would likely launch an attack at the end of January or beginning of February 2022. (Altman, 2021) It is likely that HUR was not merely issuing forecasts, but actively planning its next steps.

Likewise, the then-commander of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO), Major General Hryhoriy Khalahan, issued an order in the autumn of 2021 to prepare a network intended to remain behind Russian lines for future resistance activities. («Yura», 2024) In public interviews, Halahan also did not rule out an escalation of Russian military action. (Presservice USCC, 2021)

However, a broader increase in the combat readiness of Ukraine’s armed forces did not take place — due to reasons that will likely only be clarified through future historical research.

Assessment

In the pre-war planning phase, the Russian Federation (RF) had already set the goal of replacing the Ukrainian government, with no intention of establishing a democratic regime—i.e., consideration for the will of the Ukrainian people was not part of Russia’s plans.

Russia’s vision for Ukraine’s future did not merely involve preventing NATO expansion; even in official ideology, Ukraine was not seen as a neutral neighbor but rather as part of Russia’s «historical territories».

At the core of Russia’s operational plan was the theory of «decapitation strikes»​​​​ devised by Russian special services. The FSB was to play a central role — working in tandem with Russian airborne (and other quick reaction forces) units — to quickly neutralize Ukraine’s leadership and establish a pro-Russian puppet government. The swift seizure of key objectives was expected to lead, according to Russian calculations, to the automatic surrender of the weak Ukrainian army», eliminating the need for a prolonged battle. Historical precedents for this model include the 1968 coup in Czechoslovakia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Before launching its military invasion, the Russian Federation applied pressure on Ukraine through multiple channels: it raised energy prices, orchestrated unrest — including under the fake banner of «ultranationalists» — and held negotiations with opposition figures in anticipation of a post-coup power shift. Had these measures fully succeeded, they might have forced Ukraine to change its political leadership and orientation. In any case, Russian influence operations significantly weakened Ukraine’s defense readiness.

Nevertheless, speculation surrounds the Kremlin’s final decision to begin the invasion despite having failed to meet several key battlefield-shaping objectives. Above all, Russian special services were unable to provoke an internal political crisis in Ukraine severe enough to paralyze the state. In this regard, Russia’s pre-war hybrid attacks proved only partially effective.

At the same time, Ukraine did not broadly raise its military readiness before the full-scale Russian aggression began. The reasons for this remain speculative and are beyond the scope of this report. However, it is likely that pressure from Western countries played an important role — they urged Ukraine not to provoke Russia while simultaneously trying to dissuade the Kremlin from launching a full-scale invasion.

Yet the fact remains: deterrence efforts by Ukraine and Western countries ultimately failed, as on February 24, Putin launched the largest military operation in Europe since World War II.

In a broader sense, this war can be seen as a continuation of Russia’s colonial-imperial ambitions — a campaign by a phantom empire to reclaim control over nations that gained independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation is itself a state established in 1991, one that simulates democratic structures while subsisting in the imagined «greatness» of its past. This could be likened to a hypothetical scenario in which the United Kingdom demands the return of the United States to imperial British rule on the basis that English remains the dominant language in America — bearing in mind that, strictly speaking, the United States does not have an official language of its own.

THE TEAM

Ilmar Raag is a filmmaker and also an Estonian reserve officer who has collaborated with several Estonian universities. Within the Estonian Defense League, his research has focused on counterinsurgency analysis in the Estonian context. He has been deployed with Estonian Defence Forces three times in Africa.

Dmytro Kuzubov, a journalist from Kharkiv, has worked with major Ukrainian media outlets and led his own media projects. He conducted most of the interviews. While the film’s lead producer is the Ukrainian media company, an expanded research project involved a number of Ukrainian journalists, whose work can be found at Signaltoresist.com.ua/en/.

SOURCES

This report draws on both publicly available sources — articles, academic studies, and analytical reports — as well as interviews with Kherson residents and representatives of the Ukrainian armed forces. For security reasons, interviewees are referenced under pseudonyms. We encourage future researchers to verify our findings through further studies. Where possible, we cross-referenced interview data with publicly available sources, prioritizing citations to the latter.

Among public sources, the report — particularly in its first chapter—relies heavily on reports by the think tank RUSI, whose British researchers had access to multiple Ukrainian intelligence sources. Additionally, the Estonian intelligence analysis startup SensusQ contributed significantly by helping identify further sources on Russian occupation methods.

While this report stands by its claims, we acknowledge that this topic requires further research to refine details.