ACTIVE COMBAT PHASE OF THE WAR

The first part of the study can be found at the link

In the course of publishing reportages and investigations about the resistance movement against the Russian occupation in Kherson, as well as from available open sources, we developed a case study of resistance as observed in a specific region, which we are presenting in four parts.

In the second part of this report, we delve into the active combat phase of the war in Kherson, examining the initial battles, the rapid advance of Russian forces, and the subsequent occupation of the city. This section details the immediate impact of the occupation on Kherson's civilians, including the collapse of public services and the lack of evacuation routes, while also highlighting the crucial emergence of the first phases of Ukrainian nonviolent resistance in response to the unfolding crisis. Furthermore, we analyze the critical failure of timely evacuation routes and the subsequent spontaneous formation of vital mutual aid networks among residents.

In examining the occupation of Kherson, we distinguish between two distinct phases: first, the combat phase, during which Russian forces captured the city; and second, the occupation phase, during which Russia sought to establish administrative control. A provisional dividing line between these two phases was marked by the withdrawal of Russian regular army units and the entry of FSB forces into Kherson in March 2022. This period also coincides with the end of open anti-occupation protests and the transition of Ukrainian resistance activities underground.

Kherson: Landscape Analysis

Analysing Russian military actions during active combat necessitates examining the local terrain, as it strongly influenced tactical decisions.

Kherson Oblast lies in the south of Ukraine, bordering Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the east, Crimea to the south, and Mykolaiv Oblast to the west. The defining geographical feature is the Dnipro River, along which Kherson city — the oblast’s administrative center — is situated. The Dnipro is wide in several places, with numerous shallow islands dotting its channel. Particularly challenging for military maneuvers is the river’s delta region, a 10-kilometer-wide maze of reed-covered islands. The river thus constitutes a significant natural barrier, critical to any military planning.

At the start of the war, only two bridges provided crossings over the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast:

• Antonivskyi Bridge, located near the northern outskirts of Kherson city, approximately 1 km in length.
• Kakhovka Dam Bridge, situated at Nova Kakhovka, approximately 50 km northeast of Antonivskyi Bridge.

The eastern bank of the Dnipro (left bank) is lower and more difficult to fortify, compared to the higher western bank (right bank).

From the east, Kherson is accessible via two primary roads:

• E-97, linking Kherson with the Crimean Peninsula via Armyansk at the Crimean administrative boundary.
• E-58, connecting Kherson to the city of Melitopol.

Strategically crucial were also the land connections from Crimea to mainland Ukraine, notably via the Armyansk route and the E-105 highway through Chongar, crossing via a narrow bridge. The shortest route from Crimea to Kherson via road is roughly 90 km.

To the west of Kherson lies Mykolaiv, situated on the Southern Bug River — another significant natural obstacle impacting army movements. Thus, control over crossings of both the Dnipro and Southern Bug rivers was critical for any military operation in southern Ukraine. Furthermore, control over coastal areas directly impacts maritime navigation and strategic influence in the Black Sea.

Historical and Social Context of Kherson

The steppe region of present-day Kherson Oblast has been inhabited since at least ancient times. Russian imperial history traditionally begins Kherson’s narrative from its conquest under Catherine the Great, who formally granted city status to the existing Cossack settlement in 1778. For the Russian Empire, Kherson represented a crucial strategic colonial outpost and a major port for the Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, colonization was deliberate, involving Russian soldiers as well as forced labourers from across the empire.

Throughout subsequent history, Kherson developed a dual character: on one side, an urban, predominantly Russian-speaking population, and on the other, surrounding rural areas populated mainly by Ukrainian peasants. Importantly, Kherson was historically multiethnic, home to significant communities of Jews, Greeks, and Germans. Unlike Crimea — where the Soviet regime deported at least 191,000 Crimean Tatars in 1944 (Russian Federation, 1996) — or Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts, which saw millions perish during the Holodomor and subsequent repopulation by Russian settlers, Kherson Oblast largely escaped such brutal ethnic cleansing.

When Soviet urbanization accelerated in the 1960s–1970s, Kherson’s growth came primarily from Ukrainian migrants moving in from surrounding districts, gradually reducing the Russian proportion of the city’s population. Notably, Kherson Oblast also became home to many Crimean Tatars who were prohibited by Soviet authorities from returning to Crimea after Stalin-era deportations.

Before the 2022 invasion, Kherson’s population was approximately 275,000‌. According to Ukraine’s 2001 census, 76.5% identified as Ukrainian, 19.9% as Russian, and 3.6% as other ethnicities. Yet, in terms of native language, 73.2% spoke Ukrainian, and 24.9% Russian, suggesting that a portion of Russian speakers identified with ethnicities other than Russian.

For comparison, in Donetsk Oblast, the 2001 census recorded 56.9% Ukrainians and 38.2% Russians (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2013).

In 2014, Kherson witnessed both pro-Maidan demonstrations (supporting the Revolution of Dignity) and smaller anti-Maidan protests. Local pro-Ukrainian residents note that participants in anti-Maidan demonstrations were transported from Crimea by buses and trains, yet their numbers remained significantly lower than those supporting Maidan. Efforts to seize political power in Kherson in 2014 ultimately failed (“Ökoloog”? 2024).

During local elections in 2020, a bloc of various pro-Russian and Eurosceptic parties gained roughly 30% of votes, while pro-Ukrainian parties secured approximately 70%. This result indicates a notable pro-Russian sentiment among segments of the population, but insufficient support for them to democratically impose their preferred policies.

In sum, Kherson’s population embodied the diverse spectrum of interests and attitudes characteristic of a democratic society. Although pro-Russian and pro-Federation sentiments existed among residents, these groups lacked sufficient numbers to democratically dictate policy to the broader population.

War’s outbreak

Armyansk, Ukraine FEB24 (Stringer/Reuters)

At the start of the invasion, Russian forces in Kherson Oblast were estimated at approximately 35,000 troops. The two primary attacking units were:

• 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment and the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed from elements of the 56th Air Assault Brigade), advancing from Crimea.
• 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, attacking via Melitopol, based in peacetime in Grozny, and including the Chechen battalions Vostok-Akhmat and Zapad-Akhmat.

Between March and October 2022, various other units rotated into Kherson Oblast, including the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet and elements of the 76th Air Assault Division.

Main Ukrainian Forces

Ukraine’s primary maneuver unit at the onset was the 59th Mechanized Brigade (59 ОМПБр), stationed largely on the left bank of the Dnipro in Oleshky, though not fully mobilized or equipped at the outbreak of hostilities.

Formally, Kherson was home to the 124th Territorial Defense Brigade, but this unit had not been substantively formed or armed when fighting erupted (Vinogradov, 2023).

When combat extended into Mykolaiv Oblast, the 80th Separate Air Assault Brigade (80 ОДШБр), considered one of Ukraine’s most professional and effective units, entered the fight.

Preparations by Ukrainian Intelligence Services and SOF

Naturally, relevant branches of Ukraine’s intelligence services were also, to some extent, engaged in defensive preparations. These included the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), and the Special Operations Forces (SSO). All of them had some early warning about the upcoming Russian invasion.

HUR continued its traditional intelligence-gathering operations, which in the south of Ukraine included the Crimean Peninsula and areas along the Russian border in Rostov Oblast as their areas of interest. HUR also possessed their own special forces units in the region.

Following the adoption of the Law on the Foundations of National Resistance in 2021 (President of Ukraine, 2021), the SSO began establishing a resistance network already in the autumn of 2021, even though the law formally came into effect only in January 2022. Territorial defense units, however, were not able to fully complete the training required by law before the outbreak of hostilities.

The SBU also carried out its routine activities and they had pretty good situation awareness. SBU also had their special forces units in the region. Unfortunately, infiltration by Russian intelligence was particularly severe, which significantly undermined its effectiveness.

Progress of the Initial Fighting

Ukrainian intelligence learned the specific timing of the Russian offensive on February 21, 2022, when Moscow transmitted operational orders to regional commands. Locally, certain Kherson structures received notification on February 23 at 14:00, when the tactical invasion order was relayed in Crimea (“Jura,” 2024).

Thus, some Ukrainian intelligence branches had detailed information about the impending attack. Yet, subsequent events revealed this information did not reach all units effectively. In Kherson particularly, crucial defensive preparations failed to materialize. This failure has been attributed partly to the sabotage conducted by SBU traitor Oleg Kulinich and his network, which slowed decision-making. However, inevitable confusion and chaos typical of early-war conditions also played a significant role.

At approximately 04:00 on February 24, explosions awoke the 59th Brigade on the Dnipro’s left bank, immediately followed by airstrikes from Russian aviation, targeting Kherson International Airport. Around 05:00, Dmytro Ishchenko, commander of Kherson’s Territorial Defense Brigade, learned about the invasion and initiated emergency mobilization and defensive measures. By 11:00, Russian troops had reached the Nova Kakhovka Dam, crossing the Dnipro there. Simultaneously, roughly two companies of Russian airborne troops landed by helicopter, capturing the Antonivskyi Bridge, effectively encircling elements of the Ukrainian 59th Brigade.

At 14:00, a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter targeted a territorial defense mobilization point in Naddnipryanske (Наддніпрянське). Intense fighting erupted around Antonivskyi Bridge, involving both territorial defense volunteers and elements of the 59th Brigade. Initially, they faced only lightly armed Russian airborne infantry equipped with portable anti-tank weapons, backed by Russian air support. Ukrainian forces managed briefly to recapture the bridge, enabling some units to escape encirclement. However, about 40 Ukrainian officers, primarily from air-defense units, remained trapped behind enemy lines, hiding in the Dnipro delta.

By February 27, Russian forces had encircled Kherson city. True to their military doctrine emphasizing speed and mobility, the Russians aimed primarily to seize Mykolaiv and prepare conditions for capturing Odesa. Kherson itself was encircled and bypassed rather than immediately stormed.

At the same time, a spontaneous volunteer movement emerged in the city of Kherson. Communities formed to collect and distribute food. Meanwhile, groups of men organized themselves, often with minimal coordination, to build barricades and prepare Molotov cocktails.

On the first day of fighting, approximately 400 – 500 volunteers reported to military enlistment offices (mobilization points) in Kherson. However, it quickly became evident there were no heavy weapons available, nor any clear defensive plan. Neither oblast nor city authorities took steps to coordinate an organized defense, leaving local territorial defense units to independently prepare without proper coordination or training. Their armament consisted mostly of small arms and improvised Molotov cocktails, with potential ground forces estimated at about 1,000 fighters (Vinogradov, 2023).

Launch of Ukrainian Observation Network

The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) activated their covert observation network on the very first day of the invasion. Initially consisting solely of previously trained military personnel, the network quickly expanded to include civilians. Eventually, the SSO’s network numbered approximately several hundred operatives, whose primary task was observing enemy movements behind the frontline. Their key mission in the early days was to slow Russian advances, buying crucial time for Ukrainian forces to organize stronger defenses in Mykolaiv Oblast. An early success came on February 26, when Ukrainian aircraft successfully targeted a Russian military column near Radensk and Oleshky, guided by SSO observers.HUR and SBU special units also immediately started their respective covert operations.

Russian Capture of Kherson

At the outbreak of fighting, approximately 500 – 600 inadequately equipped Ukrainian defenders, predominantly from the 194th Territorial Defense Battalion, attempted to resist Russian forces advancing into Kherson. This force also included scattered soldiers from various other units and civilian volunteers. An illustrative incident occurred when Ukrainian defenders attempted an ambush in the open terrain of a city park against advancing Russian armored vehicles. This poorly organized attack resulted in heavy casualties—at least 18 Ukrainians were killed, primarily by BMP-mounted machine guns (Bratushchak & Bratsukyi, 2023).

On March 2, Russian representatives met Kherson Mayor Igor Kolykhaiev, who asked them to spare civilians, pointing out that Ukrainian military forces were no longer present in the city.

Criticism of Ukrainian Defenses

Immediately following the invasion, many locals suspected betrayal, given the inexplicable collapse of Kherson’s defenses. Subsequent information revealed that suspicions of sabotage had some foundation, particularly regarding infiltrators in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), notably Oleg Kulinich, who played a significant role in undermining Ukraine’s defensive actions.

Key failures identified include:

1. Absence of early warning:
   Although Kyiv and local structures had information about Russian invasion plans, the civilian population received no timely warning.
2. Incomplete territorial defense preparation:
   Territorial Defense units were neither fully mobilized nor adequately armed before the invasion.
3. Minefields on the Crimean front:
   There are lots of rumors concerning mining of strategic roads from Crimea ("bottlenecks"). The only fact is that planned minefields did not have the intended effect on the invasion forces.
4. Antonivskyi Bridge left unmined:
   Crucial for defense, the bridge remained unmined, easing the enemy's rapid advance.
5. Military enlistment offices abandoned:
   Several recruitment offices in Kherson Oblast evacuated prematurely, hindering mobilization efforts. (“Voha”, 2022)
6. Inadequate evacuation measures:
   Critical archives, orphanages, elderly homes, and prisons were not evacuated, contributing to subsequent problems such as the deportation of Ukrainian children (Svitlana, 2023).
7. Looting in the city
   The local authorities did not react quickly enough to looting in the city. (“Ecologue”, 2024)

Nevertheless, these shortcomings cannot solely be blamed on betrayal or sabotage; general wartime chaos and confusion certainly also played a significant role.

We consider the resistance movement here from a population-centric perspective, as the focal point of occupation and resistance lies in the question: to what extent does the population of the occupied territory maintain the will to resist the occupying power? In this context, we distinguish between the planned effects of the occupation and its unplanned consequences.

Lack of Evacuation Routes

Unlike many other Ukrainian cities, the majority of Kherson’s population was unable to evacuate immediately after hostilities began. By the evening of February 25, Russian troops had effectively encircled the city, leaving residents without established evacuation corridors. This quickly became a serious problem, as multiple incidents occurred where Russian soldiers fired upon civilian vehicles attempting to leave the city (Filatyev, 2022). Despite repeated requests by Kherson’s mayor, Ihor Kolykhaev, in meetings with Russian commanders, no formal humanitarian corridors were provided in the initial weeks (Kolykhaev, 2022). Later, residents cited diverse reasons for staying behind, ranging from logistical and family-related issues to disbelief — "How bad can the Russians really be?" (Alena, Svitlana, Igor, 2024).

Formation of informal Mutual Aid and Community Networks

From the very beginning of hostilities, people sought refuge in basements, cellars, or any available underground spaces. Due to the lack of properly prepared shelters, residents adapted basements under apartment buildings and workplaces as improvised shelters. These impromptu refuges frequently became community hubs, organized spontaneously by workplaces or neighborhood groups, sometimes even by apartment blocks.

Such groups quickly organized themselves into support networks, providing mutual aid, sharing food, medicine, and other essentials, and coordinating voluntary assistance (Igor, Svitlana, 2024). By the end of the first week, a clear pattern of community-based mutual assistance emerged, marking one of the earliest forms of non-violent civilian resistance under occupation.

Due to shortages and disrupted supply chains, residents quickly learned to seek help from neighbors, villages, or informal supply lines.

Collapse of Critical Public Services and Rise of Looting

During the initial days of war, essential public services and utilities in Kherson largely collapsed:

• Electricity and water disruptions occurred but did not last long, as the Russian occupation authorities were similarly interested in quickly restoring electricity, water supply, and heating services.
• Hospitals, though operational, became overwhelmed, quickly exhausting medical supplies and resources. Many residents requiring medical assistance could not get adequate care.
• Public transportation ceased operations.
• Morgues became overwhelmed due to the large number of casualties.
• Cash circulation halted, and ATMs quickly ran out of Ukrainian currency, leaving residents with limited financial resources.
• Businesses ceased operations en masse, leading to further shortages of essential goods.
• Local police forces dissolved, causing a law-enforcement vacuum that fostered chaos and insecurity.

Concurrently, widespread looting emerged, perpetrated both by opportunistic local criminals and occupying Russian soldiers. To counter looters, informal citizen vigilante groups quickly formed in neighbourhoods, marking a spontaneous reaction to protect property and personal safety. (Sergei, 2024) Some of these groups eventually evolved into grassroots underground resistance movements. (Igor, 2024) However, such groups were also susceptible to infiltration or collaboration with the occupation forces. For instance, on March 16, when local pro-Russian residents publicly gathered for the first time to show support for Russian forces, they listed restoring public order and halting looting as key objectives.

Presence and Influence of Pro-Russian Locals

Although Kherson’s pro-Russian residents did not actively assist in capturing the city, their presence had a notable psychological impact, remembered clearly by local residents:

“While Ukrainian units were still fighting around Antonivskyi Bridge, I went to the local blood donation centre. The scene struck me deeply — I had donated blood regularly since 2006, but never had I seen the centre so full. Everyone was quietly supportive, helping each other. Suddenly, a nurse entered shouting ‘Glory to the Armed Forces of Ukraine!’ and the room erupted enthusiastically in response. I'll never forget that moment.Yet, almost simultaneously, my husband called to tell me about a pharmacy-chain owner who wanted to help. Just as volunteers brought in bottled water, an elderly woman appeared carrying tea and cookies. She said: ‘This is for our boys.’ Confused, we asked her: ‘Which boys?’ She answered: ‘The Russian soldiers.’ We were stunned. The volunteer leader quickly responded: ‘Kherson is Ukraine.’ The woman left quickly, leaving everyone speechless. I still wonder what channels she had been watching — but this incident showed clearly that the vast majority of us were united firmly for Ukraine.” (Inna, 2024)

Such stories underline the complex social fabric of Kherson, where a substantial majority supported Ukraine yet lived alongside a smaller but noticeable community with pro-Russian sympathies.

Initial Steps of Russian Occupation

Generally, the primary goal of any occupying regime is to normalize local life sufficiently so the majority of the population refrains from actively resisting. The stabilization of occupation is considered complete when the majority accepts the new authority. In the context of the Russian Federation’s (RF) stabilization plans for occupied territories, the following phases were observed in Kherson:

Russian army secures the territory against military threats 

According to the doctrine, RF army units directly engaged only with military resistance, delegating the suppression of civilian resistance to FSB units, primarily Rosgvardia. In practice, this distinction was blurred. Indeed, several army units maintained relatively low profiles regarding interactions with civilians, influenced by the perception of themselves as a "liberating army." For example, initially, Ukrainian municipal authorities remained in office, and even the Ukrainian flag flew over city hall. The "liberators" narrative was reinforced by humanitarian aid provided by the Russian army, extensively covered by Russian propaganda, although many residents in Kherson refused such aid on principle.

Initially, the attitude among RF soldiers reflected a belief that they were fighting Ukrainian and NATO "Nazis," expecting gratitude from the local population. However, confusion also prevailed among soldiers, many of whom lacked clear instructions about their mission's purpose. This led simultaneously to accounts of peaceful, confused behavior by some Russian soldiers and immediate acts of looting and arbitrary violence by others. It is important to note that the Russian army’s culture broadly accepts "non-regulation" relationships, essentially permitting violence both within their own ranks and towards civilians (Filatyev, 2022). Additionally, the army units imposed movement restrictions and established checkpoints at strategic locations.

FSB units and Russian administrative structures enter the area

With certain reservations, the initial two weeks of occupation might be described as a "soft occupation" phase, lasting until larger Rosgvardia units arrived in late March. Nonetheless, it is likely some FSB units tasked with neutralizing potential resistance arrived almost immediately following army units. For instance, there is evidence suggesting FSB units monitored protests in Kherson as early as March 5 (“Sergei”, 2024).

Lower-level FSB units operated in Kherson on three-month rotations, similar to previous practices in Chechnya. These missions were generally unpopular among FSB personnel (Soldatov and Borogan, 2023). While Rosgvardia handled cities, rural areas remained largely under RF military control.

Primary FSB tasks included neutralizing resistance members and recruiting collaborators. Upon arrival, Russian forces already possessed preliminary lists, but initial operations included the seizure of civilian documents. These documents related to healthcare, education, housing, taxation, police, elections, and local governance. Beyond public administration records, private company documents — from utility firms to NGOs — were also confiscated. This information facilitated creating detailed maps indicating residency, affiliations with the Ukrainian state, and any potential connections.

The population was categorized into five main groups:

1. Individuals considered leaders of Ukrainian nationalism, targeted for physical liquidation or arrest, followed by demonstrative trials.
2. Those suspected of supporting resistance activities, either to be recruited or repressed. This included individuals associated with Ukrainian law enforcement, local government, or military personnel. Non-cooperative officials were automatically added to this category.
3. The apathetic majority, generally passive even in crises, irrespective of internal attitudes.
4. Individuals actively collaborating with Russian forces.
5. Persons essential for operating critical infrastructure, subject to monitoring (Watling, J., Danylyuk, O. V., and Reynolds, N., 2023, p. 2).

As early as March 2022, numerous incidents occurred where armed Russian soldiers systematically searched homes of former military personnel or law enforcement officials, arresting individuals (“Alena”, 2024; “Sergei”, 2024). Similarly, public sector employees were approached as early as March with proposals to continue their work under the occupation administration, detailed further in the subsequent chapter.

The Information Isolation of Kherson

Russian Federation security forces seized Ukraine’s public television center on March 4. The broadcasting of Ukrainian television programs via terrestrial antennas was discontinued and replaced with Russian programs. Initially, it was still possible to watch Ukrainian programs via cable television, but these were also cut off on March 11. Starting in April, Kherson began broadcasting the first and second Russian digital multiplex channels ("Первый канал", "Россия 1", "Россия 24", "Культура", "Матч-ТВ", НТВ, "Пятый канал", "Карусель", ТВЦ, and ОТР). On May 21, 2022, a local Russian-language radio station, controlled via Crimea, began operating. (Рябова, 2022)

Through Russian channels, people were urged to accept humanitarian aid, but instead, this triggered a small counter-demonstration on March 4. ("Sergei", 2024) Diary entries from March 8 indicate that the internet slowed down to the point of being unusable, although mobile internet was still functioning. (The Milwaukee Independent, 2022) On April 30, mobile phone service was cut off for a second time, but this was temporary. After the restoration of mobile communications, only Russian telecom operator SIM cards could be used, with all connections routed through Rostelecom. (Константинова, 2022) These SIM cards were only sold upon presentation of an identity document, meaning all activity was tracked. Now, Russian security services could monitor all phone calls and internet traffic. (Zhurzhenko, T., 2023, p. 21.)

The primary source of information became the internet, which people often accessed by visiting locations where Wi-Fi signals with VPN access were distributed.

Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter were blocked online, as were Google and YouTube in many places. The messaging service Viber, widely used in Ukraine for banking communication, was also blocked. (Zhurzhenko, T., 2023, p. 21.)

Phase One of Ukrainian Nonviolent Resistance

On March 4, 2022, Sergei Pavlyuk, director of the Kherson Theater, called via social media for people to gather in the city center on March 5 to protest against Russian occupation. By this point, Russian media had already produced propaganda stories depicting local residents gratefully receiving humanitarian aid. Simultaneously, Ukrainian media suggested that Kherson had quickly surrendered because of its allegedly pro-Russian population (Panasiuk, 2025).

On March 5, the first significant anti-occupation demonstration occurred, gathering at least 2,000 people. Sergei Pavlyuk contacted Russian military authorities to prevent bloodshed during this peaceful protest. According to Pavlyuk, besides army officers, he met representatives from the FSB and GRU, who demanded he control the crowd. Russian intelligence suspected the protests were orchestrated by Ukrainian intelligence or possibly NATO — allegations Pavlyuk denied ("Sergei," 2024). As the protest intensified, Russian soldiers fired into the air, but significant bloodshed was avoided. Videos on social media showed the Ukrainian flag still flying in the square (Schwirtz, 2022; BBC News, 2022).

Recollections:

Calling the protests "peaceful" during wartime is absurd, yet I understood their purpose. Three days of demonstrations clearly showed Kherson's opposition to the occupation, which was crucial. However, it endangered lives, and I wanted to avoid bloodshed. Later, I saw footage showing protesters grabbing soldiers from the first vehicle, leading one soldier to shoot into the air, quickly followed by others firing over people's heads. Again, these were Ukrainians from Kherson. The more soldiers fired, the more enraged the crowd became. People shouted louder, shook the vehicles — it was incredible, true resistance. ("Sergei," 2024).

If we sit at home and do not show our support for Ukraine, we implicitly agree with the Russian position. We couldn't allow that ("Igor," 2024).

It might not sound beautiful, but I wasn’t surprised. This was exactly as it should have been. I didn’t expect anything else from our people — it was natural. Some say, "I was amazed," but I would've been amazed if it had happened in Moscow or some Russian town like Ryazan or Ryupinsk. That would've truly shocked me. But here, these were our own people ("Svitlana," 2024).

This episode indicated initial hesitation by Russian army and FSB representatives to openly confront Ukrainian civilians in front of social media cameras. Meanwhile, Russian intelligence actively documented and filmed protesters to identify leaders. Because Pavlyuk helped maintain order, the FSB interrogated him multiple times, attempting to persuade him to collaborate by promising support to reopen the theater. Pavlyuk refused cooperation and subsequently ceased participating in demonstrations due to threats.

Nonetheless, protests continued spontaneously without Pavlyuk, highlighting their grassroots nature. Initially popularized via social media, these protests quickly drew mainstream global media attention by March 5. (Schwirtz, 2022; BBC News, 2022) Similar demonstrations occurred in other Ukrainian cities, with a violent incident in Nova Kakhovka on March 6, (Корогодський, 2022; Бойко, 2022).

FSB counteractions began immediately after the initial protests. By March 9, Ukraine’s Armed Forces reported at least 400 arrests by Russian forces (Ynet, 2022). A turning point occurred on March 20, when newly arrived Rosgvardia units dispersed protesters using tear gas and crowd-control measures. By March 21, demonstrators were shot in the legs, clearly signaling a crackdown through widespread arrests. Subsequent protests diminished significantly. One of the last significant demonstrations on April 27 was also dispersed using tear gas. Later calls for demonstrations were largely ignored due to intensified FSB repression.

Retrospective evaluations of the protests are mixed. Among pro-Ukrainian Kherson citizens, there's a strong narrative of pride — “despite violence, Kherson did not surrender” ("Svitlana," 2024). This pride sustained the resistance even when public demonstrations ceased. Conversely, it’s acknowledged that democratic protests against a non-democratic occupier severely endangered participants, making it easier for the FSB to identify resistance supporters ("Sergei," 2024).

After each protest, within days, its leader disappeared. Ukrainians documented these protests, reporting them to Ukrainian security services (SBU) and sharing on social media. "They essentially allowed us to protest. If they wanted, they could've eliminated us all. They weren't amateurs—they knew precisely what they were doing. Their goal was to identify patriots, calculate leaders, and neutralize them. That’s exactly what happened" ("Sergei," 2024).

At the same time, many residents began fleeing Kherson across the frontline, but Russian forces detained and filmed them. Looking back, strategically, it might have seemed naive. Demonstrations? Protests? This was a totalitarian regime. They dispersed crowds, tortured, and killed. That's their method" ("Svitlana," 2024).

Assessment

The war’s outbreak shows almost in the perfect form how Russians likely planned their invasion. The first echelon of the Russian invasion was not very large in numbers, but they effectively utilized the FSB agency’s sabotage operations and their fires superiority.The whole operation followed closely Russian military doctrine which prioritised the speed of maneuver. (Мойсеенко, Н.П.,2014) Therefore Kherson was first only isolated while the first echelon units continued immediately their advance toward Mykolaiv. It was evident that Ukrainian armed forces did not have enough units stationed in Southern Ukraine. Ukraine’s SOF and military intelligence (HUR) operated within a rather closed system. On one hand, the presence of SSO observers left behind in enemy rear areas demonstrated good integration with Ukraine’s deep-strike forces. On the other hand, the overall structure of Ukraine’s defense reflected significant coordination problems. Most notably, Ukraine’s armed forces failed to initiate any meaningful early warning in southern Ukraine.

At the same time, the events at the beginning of the war highlighted an underestimation of Ukraine’s civil society, which organized itself independently and remained cohesive enough to offer significant resistance during the subsequent occupation phase of the Russian aggression.

The importance of public protests is difficult to overstate. It is highly likely that these demonstrations had a real impact on defense-related decisions both within Ukraine and among Ukraine’s foreign allies. Had Ukrainian civil society not first demonstrated its willingness to fight for freedom, it is unlikely that Western support would have materialized as actively as it did.

The protests in Kherson were covered by nearly all major Western media outlets. In Kherson’s case, public demonstrations may have motivated the local population to continue resisting in various ways, as the community had visibly expressed its stance and set a powerful example.

It is also probable that the Russian armed forces, attempting to portray themselves as liberators, initially refrained from the harshest possible suppression of protests. As a result, Ukrainians experienced a fleeting sense of success and empowerment.

However, it is important to critically analyze the Russian Federation’s countermeasures to these protests. The FSB succeeded in neutralizing a significant number of resistance fighters. Therefore, the protests did not end because the people of Kherson grew tired or disillusioned, but rather because participation became too life-threatening. This form of resistance can only be sustained for a limited period without placing the broader resistance movement at critical risk.

THE TEAM

Ilmar Raag is a filmmaker and also an Estonian reserve officer who has collaborated with several Estonian universities. Within the Estonian Defense League, his research has focused on counterinsurgency analysis in the Estonian context. He has been deployed with Estonian Defence Forces three times in Africa.

Dmytro Kuzubov, a journalist from Kharkiv, has worked with major Ukrainian media outlets and led his own media projects. He conducted most of the interviews. While the film’s lead producer is the Ukrainian media company, an expanded research project involved a number of Ukrainian journalists, whose work can be found at Signaltoresist.com.ua/en/.

SOURCES

This report draws on both publicly available sources — articles, academic studies, and analytical reports — as well as interviews with Kherson residents and representatives of the Ukrainian armed forces. For security reasons, interviewees are referenced under pseudonyms. We encourage future researchers to verify our findings through further studies. Where possible, we cross-referenced interview data with publicly available sources, prioritizing citations to the latter.

Among public sources, the report — particularly in its first chapter—relies heavily on reports by the think tank RUSI, whose British researchers had access to multiple Ukrainian intelligence sources. Additionally, the Estonian intelligence analysis startup SensusQ contributed significantly by helping identify further sources on Russian occupation methods.

While this report stands by its claims, we acknowledge that this topic requires further research to refine details.